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INTRODUCTION

Most state constitutions impose a fundamental obligation on the state to
provide a "thorough and efficient" system of public education to its residents.
Forty years ago, The West Virginia Supreme Court held that this obligation
meant that "education is a fundamental constitutional right" in West Virginia.'
Today states continue to struggle to satisfy this burden while courts too often
struggle to interpret what such a system requires. The widespread move towards
privatization of public education through charter expansion and vouchers has had
a serious financial impact on states' abilities to provide that system, an impact3
that is national in scope.2 That national problem has a myriad of local variations.
This Article's focus is on how that financial impact is felt in Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania's Constitution mandates that the Commonwealth provide
"for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public
education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth."' Pennsylvania decided to
add charter schools to this system in 1997, a decision that, like all legislation,
must be considered in light of this constitutional commitment to public education
and to its role in preparing the Commonwealth's students for their participation
in democracy. Pennsylvania spent nearly $1.7 billion on charter schools in 20162017. Pennsylvania also underfunds its school districts. It ranks 46 out of 50
1

Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
California, for example, prohibits charter authorizers from considering the financial impact
of charter growth, a prohibition which has seriously undercut school districts' ability to provide
for the needs of the students remaining in the public schools. See GORDON LAFER, BREAKING POINT:
THE COSTS OF CHARTER SCHOOLS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2018),
2

https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/ITPI Breaking Point May2018

FINAL.pdf.
See Derek W. Black, Preferencing Educational Choice: The ConstitutionalLimits, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1395-1403 (2018) (reviewing impacts on public education of states'
preferences for school choice).
4

PA. CONST. art. III, § 14.

ACTION,
FOR
RES.
Project,
Data
School
Pennsylvania
5
https://www.researchforaction.org/pa-school-data-project/ (scroll down to the "Data Sets" section

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss3/6
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states for the state contribution to education funding and has the dubious honor
of having the largest gap in the country between highly funded districts and
poorly-funded ones.6
Charter schools cost money and the vast bulk of that money comes
directly out of the budgets of Pennsylvania school districts.' Those districts also
have the responsibilities of authorizing new charter schools, exercising oversight
over existing schools, and determining whether to renew or revoke charters.
Many charter school proponents believe that Pennsylvania's Charter School
Law' bars school districts from giving any consideration to the financial impact
on districts when they authorize or renew charter schools.9 This belief conflicts
with the plain language of the Charter School Law and its legislative history and
is not supported by court decisions. It rests on a few decisions of the Charter
Appeals Board ("CAB") which have misinterpreted the language and intent of
the Charter School Law. In these few opinions, the CAB has asserted that the
cost a new charter imposes on a district is not a factor that the authorizer can
consider. Not one opinion from the Pennsylvania appellate courts has held that
authorizers are forbidden from any consideration of financial impact.
and select the "State" hyperlink, which is found next to the "Finance" subsection) (last visited Feb.
24, 2019) [hereinafter RFA Data].
6
Emma Brown, Pa. Schools Are the Nation's Most Inequitable. The
New Governor Wants to
Fix That, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/paschools-are-the-nations-most-inequitable-the-new-goveor-wants-to-fixthat/2015/04/22/3d2f4e3e-e441-11e4-81ea-0649268f729e_story.html?utm term=deca9e248801;
School Funding Lawsuit Shows Fewer State Resources for Classrooms, Widening Inequalities,
THE PUB. INT. LAW CTR., https://www.pubintlaw.org/cases-and-projects/new-pa-school-funding-

lawsuit-court-filing-shows-decreased-classroom-spending-and-widening-inequalities/ (last visited
Feb. 24, 2019); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2016 PUBLIC ELEMENTARY-SECONDARY EDUCATION
FINANCE DATA, Summary Table 5, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/econ/schoolfinances/secondary-education-finance.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
RFA Data, supra note 5, (scroll down to "Data Sets" section, select "LEA"
hyperlink found
next to "Finance" subsection) (explaining that in 2016-2017, the Philadelphia School District paid
$779,382,016 in tuition to charter schools).
8

24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.

§§

17-1701-1709 (West 2018).

See, e.g., PHILA. SCH. ADVOCACY PARTNERS, ONE CITY, Two SYSTEMS
OF SCHOOLS 7
(2014), https://www.csfphiladelphia.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/PSAP-Position-Paper-OneCity-Two-Systems.pdf (advocating expansion of "effective schools," whether district or charter,
but stressing: "The SRC should approve every charter applicant with the potential to serve high
poverty students effectively while staggering the openings of these schools in order to allow time
to manage the resulting financial impact (i.e., shed fixed costs)"). Excellent Schools PA filed a
lawsuit in April 2018 to enjoin the Philadelphia School District from implementing a policy for
evaluating charter schools' requests for amendments of their charters in which it alleged:
According to the Policy, the [Charter School Office] will "review" financial impact on the District
as an evaluative tool for enrollment increase or change to grade levels. Such a consideration is
impermissible under the Charter School Law and controlling case law ....
It is well settled in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that the District's financial considerations should not be a basis
upon which a charter application should be evaluated." First Amended Complaint at 133, Excellent
Sch. Pa. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 01579 (C.P. Phila. Cty. June 25, 2018), ECF No. 180401579.
9
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Balancing the needs and interests of all of the stakeholders in the public
education system-students, families, teachers, support staff, administrators,
schools (both traditional and charter), tax payers, retirees, and communities-is
an enormous challenge. Charter schools are part of that public education
system.'o But requiring school districts to completely ignore the financial impact
of their decisions about charter growth cannot be the response to that challenge.
Districts would be inappropriately constrained from considering how charter
growth could be managed to benefit the entire system. For example, a proposed
charter that would ease overcrowding in existing traditional schools might have
a positive financial impact on the entire system. Similarly, a charter that is
proposed to serve a badly underserved population, for example, children in
institutional foster care placement, might also not only meet a need but have a
positive financial impact on the system as a whole. Considering financial impact
does not inevitably mean denial of all new charters. But it should mean that
district authorizers can look at the big picture of how the proposed school affects
the existing traditional and charter schools. If charters must be granted and
renewed without any consideration of their financial impact on the school system
as a whole, Pennsylvania will be even further impaired in its ability to meet its
constitutional obligations. Thus, authorizers not only may consider financial
impact, they must do so.
The argument against consideration of financial impact fundamentally
conflicts with public education's role as a public good that does not exist merely
for individual advancement." Derek Black has traced the history of the state
constitutional provisions, like Pennsylvania's, that obligate every state to provide
12
a system of public education to its children. These provisions, as Black so
effectively demonstrates, ground that obligation in a view of education as a
13
public good because education is necessary to citizenship. The entire
community benefits from all of its members being prepared for civic
participation.
Our public education systems, though flawed, are intended to reach all
children.14 Proponents of privatization as the key to education reform situate
Whether charters are fully public is sometimes contested, however, especially in charter
10
unionization drives and in transparency fights. See, e.g., Amelia A. DeGory, Note, The
JurisdictionalDifficulties ofDefining Charter-SchoolTeachers Unions Under CurrentLaborLaw,
66 DUKE L.J. 379 (2016); Aaron Saiger, Charter Schools, the Establishment Clause, and the
Neoliberal Turn in Public Education, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1163, 1178-81 (2013).
David F. Labaree, Public Schools for Private Gain: The DecliningAmerican Commitment
"
2018),
22,
(Oct.
KAPPAN
DELTA
PHi
Good,
Public
the
Serving
to
http://www.kappanonline.org/labaree-public-schools-private-gain-decline-americancommitment-public-good/.
Derek W. Black, The ConstitutionalCompromise to GuaranteeEducation, 70 STAN. L. REV.
12

735,793n.311 (2018).
13
14

Id. at 743-48.
Labaree, supra note 11; Black, supra note 12, at 735.
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charters through a much narrower view: that individual parents should choose
which school will most suit their individual child and that their individual choice
should be valued over all other interests." Certainly parents should have a major
voice in their children's education but that voice is not the only one that matters
when we consider public education a public good. Preferencing individual choice
in a way that undermines the public system as a whole undercuts what benefits
all of society." Black urges us to look at the impact of market-based (and other)
education reforms on a district and not just a state-wide or even national level in
order to fully appreciate how such reforms can affect the democratic goals of the
public education system." This article examines one such impact: the
misconception that financial costs of charter growth in a district cannot be a
factor in the district's decision to authorize new charters. This is not an argument
for the total elimination of charter schools; they are part of the landscape and part
of the system of public education in Pennsylvania. But the authorizing districts
have to consider the needs of all of the stakeholders, including both traditional
public schools and existing charters, when those districts make decisions that
affect their budgets and their ability to provide an effective education to all of
their students.
The charter proponents' argument-that authorizers cannot consider the
financial impact of charters-is not new, but it has been heightened in recent
years. The argument ignores the conflicts between responsible stewardship of
public funds, the state's constitutional obligation to provide a thorough and
efficient system of public education, and the demand of some charter proponents
that charters be expanded regardless of any costs they impose on the system as a
whole. Part II of this article details the costs that districts face as a result of
charter expansion. Part III examines the argument against consideration of
financial impact. Part IV explores both the language and the legislative history
of the Pennsylvania Charter School Law, along with contemporaneous news
accounts. Part V traces the origins of the myth through analysis of the decisions
of the Charter Appeal Board and court opinions and the state's constitutional
15

JEANNE ALLEN, THE NEW OPPORTUNITY AGENDA: A MANIFESTO
MOVEMENT AT RISK

22

(2016) ("The best and quickest path to unleash innovation is to follow a consumer model of
organization theory, and ensure that money follows the consumer to the product they want - their
school of choice."); Associated Press, County GOP Chair: Oklahoma Should Quit Public
Education, NEWSOK (Nov. 29, 2018), https://newsok.com/article/feed/7535988/oklahomalawmaker-education-remains-priority-despite-letter; Mark Gleason, Testimony to the Basic
Education
Funding
Commission,
PHILA.
SCH.
P'SHIP
(Nov.
14,
2014),
https://philaschoolpartnership.org/mark-gleasons-testimony-to-the-basic-education-fundingcommission/ ("Second, make the basic education formula truly student-based. Money should
follow the student."); James V. Shuls, Do Charter Schools Take Districts'Money? Only If You
Think Children, and the Funding That Comes With Them, Are DistrictProperty, THE 74 MILLION
(Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.the74million.org/article/shuls-do-charter-schools-take-districtsmoney-only-if-you-think-children-the-funding-that-comes-with-them-are-district-property/).
16
See Black, supra note 3, at 1359.
17

Id at 1425-26.
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obligations. This Article concludes that not only do the state and local charter
authorizers have the right to consider financial impact, they must do so to comply
with the constitutional obligations of the state.
II. THE COST: IN 2016-2017, PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL DISTRICTS PAID
CHARTERS NEARLY $1.7 BILLION

In 2017-2018, Pennsylvania was home to 163 brick-and-mortar charter
schools and 15 cyber charters which enrolled approximately 135,000 students.s
School districts paid charter schools $1,654,992,896 in 2016-2017.19 Under the
Charter School Law, charter schools receive the per pupil funding of the districts
20
its students reside in. For example, out of the total $2.96 billion in expenditures
projected for fiscal year 2018, the School District of Philadelphia projected
21
spending $894 million on charter schools, not counting transportation costs.
The district is obligated to send those funds to the charter schools out of its own
budget.

The most significant financial impact charters have on existing school
22
districts is the stranded costs they impose. Stranded costs refer to the districts'
inability to completely recoup the loss of tuition money they must send to
charters because the departure of a student and her tuition dollars from the district
to the charter does not lead to an equal reduction in costs to the district. Charter
schools draw students from across the district. In a large district like
Philadelphia, the charter students may come from dozens of schools and many
may come from non-public schools. Philadelphia cannot simply close down
existing schools or reduce existing staff when those losses are spread over
numerous schools. If a neighborhood elementary school loses ten students from
four grades to a new charter, there is no way for that school to reduce the teaching
or administrative staff in response. And the building still has to be heated, to be
Types ofSchools, PA DEPT. OF EDUC., https://www.education.pa.gov/Schools/Pages/TypesIS
of-Schools.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
RFA Data, supra note 5 (scroll down to the "Data Sets" section and select "LEA" hyperlink
'9
found next to "Finance" subsection).
24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1725-A (West 2018) (The funding is based on the
20
District's spending on K-12 and does not include pre-K, adult education, or other non-K-12
of the
expenses. Cyber charters receive the same funding based on the per pupil expenditures
charters
student's district of residence as the CSL makes no distinction between bricks and mortar
and cyber charters in the funding provision.).
21

SCH. DIST. OF PHILA., BUDGETING 101: UNDERSTANDING THE DISTRICT'S BUDGET 25 (May

https://www.philasd.org/budget/wp2017),
3,
6 2
Final.pdf.
017/07/Budgetl01_5.3.17
/
content/uploads/sites/9
22
SIX

DAVID LAPP ET AL., THE FISCAL IMPACT OF CHARTER SCHOOL EXPANSION: CALCULATIONS IN
2017),
(Sept.
ACTION
FOR
RES.
DISTRICTS,
SCHOOL
PENNSYLVANIA
2

https://8rri53pm0cs22jk3vvqnalub-wpengine.netdna-ssi.com/wp-content/uploads/ 017/09/RFAFiscal-Impact-of-Charter-Expansion-September-2017.pdf (The RFA study included six districts
from across Pennsylvania. The stranded costs issue affected all six.).
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cleaned, to have lights and water. The costs of running the traditional school
remain but the funds for the charter students are gone. The Research for Action
("RFA") study calculates the stranded costs for Philadelphia at $8,125 per
student in the first year of a charter's operation, declining over five years to
between $4,433 and $3,803 per student depending on the rate of growth of the
charter sector. 23 The stranded costs remain as a drag on the district budget for
years and, where approved schools continually expand enrollments, the costs
continue. 2 4 In 2017-2018, Philadelphia had approximately 70,000 students
enrolled in its 84 charter schools.2 5 Using RFA's lowest stranded costs figure
from five years out, not including cyber charter students or students who
transferred from private school, Philadelphia's stranded costs in that year totaled
at least $266,210,000 ($3,803 multiplied by 70,000).26 The bottom line is that the
stranded costs are enormous and permanent so a fiscally responsible authorizer
would be foolish not to consider how the stranded costs associated with a new
charter might impact the district as a whole.
Closing district schools is usually proposed as the solution to this
financial cost but such closures have their own costs, financial and otherwise.
Scholars are beginning to focus on how closures of neighborhood schools have
deprived communities of their anchors,27 how the brunt of closures has fallen on
communities of color, and how neighborhood school closures accompanied by
intensified policing of the remaining schools has increased students' early
contact with the carceral state and has decreased the overall commitment to the
ideal of schools as community institutions.28 In Philadelphia at least, the District

23
Id. at iii. The study notes that it did not calculate the additional financial
impact of the tuition
loss from charter students who came from private schools, although that calculation would result
in a total loss with no savings to the District. Thus, the study's estimates are conservative. If the
private school transfers accounted for only ten percent of Philadelphia's charter sector, the cost per
student would increase by $1,000. The study further notes that an earlier study by the Boston
Consulting Group estimated that 30% ofPhiladelphia's charter students come from private schools.
Id. at 28, n.23.
24
Idat17.

Sch. Dist. of Phila., CHARTER SCH. OFF., https://www.philasd.org/charterschools/
(last
visited Mar. 19, 2019). This figure does not include students enrolled in cyber charters. Id.
26
RFA calculated that "On average, the size of the fiscal impact of
charter expansion equals
89% of the district's charter school tuition payments during the first year of charter expansion and
44% of the district's charter tuition payments during the fifth year of charter expansion."
See Lapp,
supranote 22, at 29.
27
See generally EVE EWING, GHOSTS IN THE SCHOOLYARD: RACISM
AND
25

SCHOOL CLOSINGS ON
CHICAGO'S SOUTH SIDE (2018); CARLA SHEDD, UNEQUAL CITY: RACE, SCHOOLS, AND PERCEPTIONS
OF INJUSTICE (2015); Ryan Good, Histories That Root Us: Neighborhood, Place, and the

Protest

of School Closures in Philadelphia, 38 URB. GEOGRAPHY 861 (2016); Ryan Good, Invoking

Landscapes of Spatialized Inequality: Race, Class, and Place in Philadelphia'sSchool Closure
Debate, 39 J. URB. AFF. 358 (2016).
28

Labaree, supra note 11.
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has yet to realize significant savings from selling former school buildings though
it has shed the costs of actually running the closed schools.
In addition, there is no question that running multiple school systems
increases the costs to the funder of those systems. This result is logical. Even
when an entire school is turned over to private management, there are still
duplicative costs for administration and costs for oversight. Charters in
Pennsylvania spend a much higher percentage of their funds on administration
30
and principals.29 Charters tend to be heavy on administrators-by design. Each
charter is its own school district under the Charter School Law ("CSL"), so
instead of just a principal, charter schools have a proliferation of CEOs and
31
school leaders of various kinds. Another side effect of the market approach is
that charters and districts feel the need to compete in that market through
32
advertising-which also diverts money from direct education.
Pennsylvania's funding system for special education also encourages the
manipulation of special education expenses by some charter operators. The
CSL's formula for special education students incorporates Pennsylvania's
33
"census-based" approach to distribution of special education funding. Under
this approach, "each school district is assumed to serve a special education
34
population equal to 16%" of the district's average student enrollment. The

29

PA.

SCH.

EXPENDITURES,

BDS.

Ass'N.,
AND

PSBA

SPECIAL

REPORT:

TRANSPARENCY

10,

CHARTER

SCHOOL

REVENUES,

https://www.psba.org/wp-

content/uploads/2016/08/Charter-School-RtK-08172016.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
Matt Barnum, Analysis: CharterSchools Spend More on Administration-ButIt Might Not
Be Bad for Kids, THE 74 (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.the74million.org/article/analysis-charterschools-spend-more-on-administration-but-it-might-not-be-bad-for-kids/.
KIPP Philadelphia, which comprises six schools, lists 32 individuals on its management
31
team, not counting the multiple administrators at each school. KIPP: PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, http://kippphiladelphia.org/about/who-we-are/regional-office/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2019). Charter proponents on occasion claim that charters save money, pointing out that under the
CSL, charters get only 80% of the per pupil funding of the authorizing school district. But 80% is
not less spending-it simply reflects the difference in K-12 spending compared to the costs the
District has for pre-K, adult education, and transportation, which the CSL excludes. The arguments
that charters are underfunded or more financially efficient also ignore the substantial outside
funding available to charters from pro-privatization foundations like the Walton, Dell, and Gates
Foundations. Sally Ho, Billionaires Fuel US Charter Schools Movement, Shaping State Policy,
PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIG. (July 23, 2018), https://philanthropynewsdigest.org/news/billionaires30

fueling-charter-school-movement-shaping-state-policy.
32

CATHERINE DIMARTINO & SARAH BUTLER JESSEN, SELLING SCHOOL: THE MARKETING OF

PUBLIC EDUCATION 70-76 (2018) (noting that the New York charter chain, Success Academy,
spends more than $1,000 per enrolled student on advertising). This pressure to advertise privileges
well-resourced charter networks over stand-alone charters and districts that cannot afford to divert
money to advertising.

33

RES. FOR ACTION, CHARTER SCHOOL SPECIAL EDUCATION FUNDING IN PENNSYLVANIA 2-3

https://8rri53pm0cs22jk3vvqnalub-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp2017),
(April
content/uploads/2017/04/RFA-Charter-Special-Education-Funding-Memo-April-2017.pdf.
34

Id. at 2.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss3/6

8

DeJarnatt: A Legal Mandate That Authorizers Consider Fiscal and Other Impact
2019]

CHARTER SCHOOL EXPANSION

8 19

formula does not measure actual costs or actual numbers of special education
students. And the formula does not vary depending on the costs to educate
students with different disabilities." Thus, the state funding for the school
district's special education is calculated based on the 16% presumption, not the
actual enrollment numbers. The district's obligation to charters for tuition
reimbursement, however, is based on the district's actual per pupil spending on
special education. Charters receive one level of funding based on the per pupil
cost for non-special education students and the special education rate for all
students with the special education designation no matter what the level of
disability or the costs to remediate that disability. That higher figure is typically
more than double the funding for non-special education students.3 6
Pennsylvania does not require charter schools to actually spend this extra
money on special education. The Special Education Funding Commission and
others have shown that, particularly in Philadelphia and Chester-Upland,37 the
charter schools have a much higher percentage of students with lower cost needs,
leaving students who need the most expensive services in the traditional district
schools. The Commission found that 72% of the charter students required less
than $10,000 of additional services while only 2% of charter students cost
$3 0,000-$ 100,000 compared to 10% of the special education students in district
schools with those high cost needs. This disparity further distorts the payments
to charter schools because the actual district spending goes up to cope with the
high cost students, thus increasing the amount on which the charter payments are
based-even though the charters do not have the same costs and do not actually
have to spend the money on their special education programs.
3
Id. at 3. As the RFA Charter School Special Education Funding study
notes, in 2014, a new
formula was adopted that divides students into three different costs categories and provides more

funding for students with costlier needs. But this new formula applies only to new revenues and
covers only about five percent of the total special education funding in Pennsylvania. Id. at 2-3.
36
The RFA Charter School Special Education Funding study also shows the tuition
calculation
for 2015 for the Daniel Boone School District which resulted in a per pupil payment of $9,866.83
for nonspecial education charter students and $20,561.12 for special education students. Id. at 4.
37
Vince Sullivan, Judge Oks Chester Upland School District Deal with Charter
School,
DAILY TIMES (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.delcotimes.com/news/judge-oks-chester-uplandschool-district-deal-with-charter-schooUarticle 4 fl47030-a888-5676-bO7e-6f72bce7ef87.html.
38
Bruce Baker demonstrated three different aspects of this distortion in
operation in his
examination of the Chester-Upland District. Bruce Baker, The Commonwealth Triple-Screw:
Special Education Funding & CharterSchool Payments in Pennsylvania, SCH. FIN. 1010 BLOG
(June 5, 2012), https://schoolfinancel01.wordpress.com/2012/06/05/the-commonwealth-triplescrew-special-education-funding-charter-school-payments-in-pennsylvania/.
First, because of
16% assumption, the state's funding for special education in Chester-Upland does not reflect that
the district actually has 22% of its students in the special education category. Id. So, the District
receives nearly $2,000,000 less from the state than it would if the state funding was based on reality
instead of assumption. Id. Second, Chester-Upland's per pupil spending on special education for
charter tuition is distorted by the requirement that the figure be based on the number of students
being the assumed 16% not the actual 22%, thus artificially increasing the cost per pupil number.
Id. The total the District spends on special education is divided by the artificial number based on
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On the whole, Pennsylvania charter schools educate fewer children with
high cost special needs, fewer English language learners, and fewer children in
deep poverty. Those kids need greater resources and those who remain in
traditional public schools suffer the brunt of the financial impact of charter
growth.
Effective oversight is also expensive. The Philadelphia Charter School
39
Office ("CSO") itself has to be staffed to ensure compliance. The CSO is
responsible for evaluating applications, for collecting information on existing
40
schools annually, and for processing requests for amendments and renewals.
This cost is not covered by a tax on the charters or any designated funding from
the state. The Fiscal Year 2017-2018 Budget projected the costs for salaries for
the CSO at $935,379.41
Charter appeals and other legal fights are also expensive. Closing a
charter school, whether through revocation or non-renewal, can involve a very
lengthy process. The saga of the Pocono Mountain Charter School illustrates how
much this struggle can cost a school district. Pennsylvania's Auditor General
calculated that the Pocono Mountain School District had to spend $400,000 to
hold the charter school accountable, first voting to revoke its charter in 2010.42
The school was finally closed in the summer of 2014 after 16 hearings at the
District level, 2 trips to the CAB which ultimately affirmed the revocation
43
decision, and an affirmance of the CAB decision by the Commonwealth Court.
the 16% figure, not the actual number based on the 22% figure, which thus inflates it. Id. Finally,
the per pupil figure is treated the same no matter what the student's disability needs cost. Id. 92%
of the students at the largest charter school in Chester-Upland have the lowest cost disabilities
compared to only 66% of such students in the school district. Id. The District's spending reflects
the higher costs of its higher needs students yet it must send the charter the entire per pupil cost,
even though the charter's students' needs are much less costly. Sullivan, supranote 37. The District
ran out of money in no small part due to the inflated special education payments it had to make to
the charter schools. Id.
CHARTER SCH. OFF., supra note 25.
39
40

Id.

FY2017-18 CONSOLIDATED BUDGET 263
96 20
/ 17/07/FY1 8https://www.philasd.org/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/
2017),
(May
Consolidated-SDPBook_FINAL.pdf This figure does not account for the resources the District's
lawyers must devote to charter oversight and appeals.
41

Sca. DIST. OF PILA.: SCH. REFORM COMM'N,

42

EUGENE DEPASQUALE, PA. DEP'T OF AUDITOR GEN., PA. CHARTER ScH. ACCOUNTABILITY

2014),
12,
(May
9-10
https://www.paauditor.gov/media/default/reports/RPT-CharterSchool`%20Report/`20051214
final.pdf [hereinafter DEPASQUALE REPORT].
Pocono Mountain Charter Sch., Inc. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 88 A.3d 275 (Pa.
43
Commw. Ct. 2014). The school remained open throughout the appeals, though, by the end, it was
being run by a court-appointed custodian and had no board of trustees. DEPASQUALE REPORT, supra
note 42, at 10. Lindsay C. VanAsdalan, Thackston Charter Will Not Appeal, Board Votes to
Dissolve at End of June, YORK DISPATCH (June 29, 2018, 11:38 AM),
20
18/06/29/thackston-charter-not-appeal-voteshttps://www.yorkdispatch.com/story/news/
2
dissolve-end-june/74426600 /.
AND

TRANSPARENCY:

TIME

FOR

A

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss3/6

TUNE-UP

10

DeJarnatt: A Legal Mandate That Authorizers Consider Fiscal and Other Impact
2019]

CHARTER SCHOOL EXPANSION

821

The School District faced an additional financial insult even after the charter
school finally closed because the Pennsylvania Department of Education
deducted $87,700.32 from the district's basic education funds to cover the charter
school's failure to make required payments to the public employee's retirement
fund for its staff. The school district had to fight the deduction all the way up to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which ultimately found that the District was not
liable for the charter school's delinquency."
Cyber charters are also expensive for districts. They are funded in
exactly the same way as brick and mortar schools. They get the identical per
pupil funding from the districts where their students reside-even though they
lack both bricks and mortar. This funding scheme has been criticized widely,
including by the Auditor General.4 5 These costs are borne by the districts whose
residents choose to enroll in cyber charters even though the district has no power
to stop expansion of cyber charters or powers of oversight to ensure they are
providing an education to those students.4 6
In short, any decision to authorize a new charter or to expand an existing
one imposes significant financial demands on the authorizing district, demands
that a responsible steward of public funds must consider. This is true despite the
arguments to the contrary raised by some charter proponents.
III. THE ARGUMENT: DISTRICT AUTHORIZERS CANNOT CONSIDER FINANCIAL
IMPACT BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE ALREADY DECIDED THE COSTS
OF CHARTERS WERE WORTH THE BENEFITS

Charter proponents in Philadelphia have often argued that the District is in such
catastrophic shape and does such a poor job serving its students that charter
expansion is imperative and must take place regardless of the costs.47 Others have
Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep't of Educ., 151 A.3d 129 (Pa.
2016).
DEPASQUALE REPORT, supra note 42, at 23-24.
46
Cyber charters are authorized at the state level; oversight and
renewal decisions are the
province of the state department of education. 24 PA. STAT. AND CONs. STAT. ANN. § 17-1741-A
4

45

(2018).

47
See, e.g., PSP Statement on Applications for New Charter Schools,
PHILA. SCH.
PARTNERSHIP, https://philaschoolpartnership.org/psp-statement-on-applications-for-new-charterschools/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2019) (quoting Mark Gleason on the 2015 cycle of applications for
new charters: "As the SRC faces tough decisions about how to spend its limited resources in the
coming months, I hope the debate will center on what is working for kids and families. We should
consider that last year the District spent about $140 million to operate schools that by any measure
fail to meet students' needs (<40 on the PA School Performance Profile). As the most recent SPP
data show, many of the high-quality charter schools applying are doing a much better job than
other public schools in educating our city's poorest students. By allowing these schools to replicate
and expand, the SRC can give more students across the city the opportunity to attend an effective
school."); Kristen A. Graham & Martha Woodall, Turzai Pushesfor Many New
Phila. Charters,
PHILA.
INQUIRER
(Jan.
22,
2015),
https://www.philly.com/philly/education/20150123_Turzai-touts-new-charterson-dayPhila
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asserted explicitly that financial impact cannot be considered by a district in
Pennsylvania when it is making decisions to authorize new charters, or to renew
or amend existing ones.48 At least one member of the School Reform
Commission ("SRC") accepted this argument and believed the SRC was not able
49
to reject applications based on costs.

One of the most extreme versions of this argument was posited in a
lawsuit filed in the spring of 2018 by Excellent Schools PA against the
0
Philadelphia School District and the SRC.s The lawsuit sought injunctive relief
to stop the District from implementing a new policy on amendments to existing
charters. The policy on charter amendments was adopted by the SRC after
months of negotiation and communication with stakeholders" and was adopted
in response to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, which held that the
Charter School Law did not give the CAB jurisdiction to hear appeals where an
52
amendment request had been denied. The policy would allow material
amendments to existing charters under specified conditions and with the
53
approval of the SRC/Board of Education.

-

schoolslearnofmore money problems.html (reporting that the State House speaker pushes
SRC to approve 27 new charters).
48
Kristen A. Graham, Pressure Builds on SRC to Approve New Charter Schools, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Feb. 17, 2015, at B04 (SRC Commissioner Green says financial impact cannot be
considered).
The SRC ran the Philadelphia School District from 2002 to July 2018 under a state takeover.
49
The SRC took the position that it could not cite financial costs as a reason to deny a charter
PUB. SCH.
application. SRC Denies Six Chartersand Approves One with Conditions, THE PHILA.
6
22
/src-denieshttp://thenotebook.org/articles/2018/02/
pm),
8:49
2018,
NOTEBOOK (Feb. 22,
charters-approves-one-with-conditions/.
50
First Amended Complaint, Excellent Sch. Pa. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 01579 (C.P. Phila.
at
available
(Docket
180401579
No.
ECF
2018),
25,
June
Cty.
Amended
First
The
frames).
dktrpt
https://fdefile.phila.gov/efsfd/zkjdpublic_qry_03.zp
Complaint is on file with author. In it, the plaintiff asserts it is acting on behalf of 44 "like-minded
Philadelphia charter schools adversely impacted" by the policy but no schools are identified by
name and none signed on as plaintiffs. Id. at para. 10.
51
Escalating Conflict with District, Pro-CharterGroup Sues over Policy, THE PHILA. PUB.
SCH. NOTEBOOK (Apr. 12, 2018), https://thenotebook.org/articles/2018/04/12/escalating-conflict4 6
with-district-charters-sue-over-policy- 0 /.
52
Discovery Charter Sch. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 166 A.3d 304, 306 (Pa. 2017).
The Policy, adopted by the SRC on March 22, 2018, defines Material Amendment as:
53
"Material charter amendments - Changes to charter agreements that fundamentally affect a charter
school's mission, governance, organizational structure, location or facility, educational plan or the
CSO's ability to effectively monitor charter school operations and quality. Material charter
amendments include: 1. Enrollment expansion of 10% or fewer of the current maximum authorized
enrollment or 100 seats, whichever is less (only qualified applicants as defined by eligibility criteria
of this policy may be considered for enrollment expansions under this policy); 2. Change to grade
levels served; 3. Significant change to mission, or fundamental change to educational plan; 4.
Name change of Renaissance charter schools due to business-need or legal requirement; 5. Change
in building location or addition of new facility due to business-need, unavailability of current
facility and/or emergency; and 6. Change in CMO." 406. CharterAmendments, THE ScH. DIST. OF
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The Excellent Schools PA lawsuit raised several arguments, but the one
relevant here is the plaintiff s attack on the policy's inclusion of financial impact
on the District as one of thirteen listed criteria for evaluation of proposed charter
amendments.5 4 The lawsuit asserted that this consideration violates "wellsettled" law in Pennsylvania that the "District's financial considerations should
not be a basis upon which a charter application should be evaluated."" It cites a
CAB decision in support of this argument."
The context of the lawsuit makes clear that its proponents believe that
there can be no consideration at all of the costs of charter growth, whether
through authorization of new charters or amendments to existing ones. The thrust
of the Excellent Schools argument is that charter schools should be able to amend
their charters at will, even by expanding the enrollment they agreed to in the
original charter. This view renders illusory the notions that a charter is a binding
agreement or that the school district needs to be able to plan for charter growth
and changes.
Another charter dispute in Philadelphia illustrates the related claim that
charter growth is so necessary, it must be allowed despite any impact on the
District as a whole. Franklin Towne Charter Middle School's ("FTCMS")
application for a charter was granted-but with conditions, including a reduction
in the requested enrollment and a requirement that enrollment priority be given
to students from two predominantly minority zip codes.57 FTCMS has filed an
appeal to the CAB, arguing that the conditions amount to a denial of its

(Mar.
22,
2018),
https://www.philasd.org/src/wpcontent/uploads/sites/80/2018/03/406_Charter-Amendments.pdf.
54
First Amended Complaint, supra note 50, at Exhibit D. The policy notes that
these are not
the exclusive criteria.
5
Id. at ¶ 133. According to the Policy, the [Charter School Office] will "review" financial
impact on the District as an evaluative tool for enrollment increase or change to grade levels. Such
a consideration is impermissible under the Charter School Law and controlling case law ..... It
is well settled in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that the District's financial considerations
should not be a basis upon which a charter application should be evaluated."
56
In re Fell Charter Sch. (Docket No. CAB 2001-9), aff'd, Carbondale
Area Sch. Dist. v. Fell
Charter Sch., 829 A.2d 400 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003). See infra notes 124-129 for analysis of these
decisions.
57
The existing Franklin Towne charter schools have very high enrollments
of white students,
especially compared to the demographics of the school district. Franklin Towne Charter
Elementary School is 83.9% white and Franklin Towne Charter High School is 68.5% white
according to the data available in the School Performance Profiles of the state Department of
Education. See Franklin Towne Charter Elementary School, FUTURE READY PA INDEX,
https://futurereadypa.org/School/FastFacts?id=2071041041721851980580201361340180790532
40151105 (last visited Mar. 24, 2019); Franklin Towne CHS, FUTURE READY PA INDEX,
https://futurereadypa.org/SchoolFastFacts?id=l 431242521571062080862460060370780271750
06154159 (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). District Enrollment & Demographics, SY2017-2018,
(linked excel spread sheet identifies the District enrollment as 15% white).
PHILA.
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application, not a grant." The appeal detailed several conditions that FTCMS
found objectionable, including the reduction of enrollment to 300, down from
the 450 requested in the application.5 ' Paragraph 20(b) of the FTCMS Appeal
asserts: "As part of the application process charter schools must demonstrate
financial viability; reduction of the school's enrollment from 450 students to 300
students would render the school non-viable as a financial matter."60
Essentially, the Franklin Towne representatives assert that because their
schools have good test scores, they should be allowed to expand no matter how
that expansion affects the broader community. The FTCMS appeal challenges
the District's ability to continue efforts to promote fiscal responsibility, to reduce
conflicts of interest, and to encourage charters to reach out to diverse
communities. 61
LANGUAGE OF THE CHARTER SCHOOL LAW IMPLICITLY
REQUIRES AND DOES NOT EXPLICITLY FORBID CONSIDERATION OF
FINANCIAL IMPACT

IV. THE PLAIN

The plain language of the Charter School Law ("CSL") essentially
requires and explicitly does not forbid authorizers from considering financial
impact. Where the language of a statute is clear, Pennsylvania requires that the
plain language is controlling.62 If the statutory language is not explicit, one must

58

A copy of the appeal is on file with the author, obtained through a Right to Know request.

Id.T20.a.
Id. One wonders if the financial viability issue is related to the convoluted leasing
arrangements among the various Franklin Towne schools and related for-profit entities. See Greg
Windle, In the Convoluted World of CharterSchool Real Estate, Franklin Towne Is Both Landlord
2018),
25,
(Apr.
NOTEBOOK
SCH.
PUB.
PHILA.
THE
Tenant,
and
http://thenotebook.org/articles/201 8/04/25/in-the-sometimes-convoluted-world-of-charterschool-real-estate-franklin-towne-is-both-landlord-and-tenant/. Other Philadelphia middle school
charters have enrollments similar to that proposed in the SRC's conditions. See, e.g., KIPP West
59

60

Philadelphia

Preparatory

Charter

School,

THE

SCH.

DIsT.

OF

PHILA.,

https://www.philasd.org/charterschools/directory/kipp-west-philadelphia-preparatory-charterschool/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2019); Young Scholars Charter School, THE ScH. DIST. OF PHILA.,
(last visited
https://www.philasd.org/charterschools/directory/young-scholars-charter-school/
in the
participate
it
that
requirement
the
to
objected
specifically
Mar. 1, 2019). FTCMS also
District's Charter Performance Framework and that it have insurance in the types and coverage
directed by the District.
61
See Greg Windle, Franklin Towne to Come Back Before the SRC Thursday in Pursuit of
2018),
25,
(Apr.
NOTEBOOK
SCH.
PUB.
PHILA.
THE
School,
Third
http://thenotebook.org/articles/2018/04/25/franklin-towne-set-to-come-back-before-src-thursdayin-pursuit-of-third-school/.
Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act, 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921 (2018). The Act states:
62
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain
and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall
be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
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turn to the intent of the legislature. 63 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
emphasized these principles in its consideration of the Charter School Law. 6
This section will examine the plain language of the Charter School Law
to show that it essentially requires and nowhere forbids school districts from
considering whether the financial impact of charter expansion will undercut the
district's ability to provide a thorough and efficient education to its students. It
will then review the legislative intent as expressed in the legislative history of
the CSL's enactment.
A.

The PlainLanguage of the CharterSchool Law

The plain language of the Charter School Law nowhere explicitly bars
consideration of cost as a factor for authorizers in evaluating an application to
open a new charter school. It implicitly requires such consideration. The plain
language of the statute shows that it is premised on an expectation that charter
schools will be a supplement to, not a replacement of, the existing system of
schools; the statute repeatedly refers to charters as an additional component of
the existing school system. The opening section of the CSL states that:
It is the intent of the General Assembly, in enacting this article,
to provide opportunities for teachers, parents, pupils and
community members to establish and maintain schools that
operate independently from the existing school district
structure as a method to accomplish all of the following: (1)
Improve pupil learning. (2) Increase learning opportunities for
all pupils. (3) Encourage the use of different and innovative
teaching methods. (4) Create new professional opportunities for
teachers, including the opportunity to be responsible for the

(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter
of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General
Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar
subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.

(c)

Id.
63

Id

6

See, e.g., Slippery Rock Area Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Cyber Charter Sch., 31
A.3d 657, 663 (Pa.

2011).
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learning program at the school site. (5) Provide parents and
pupils with expanded choices in the types of educational
opportunities that are available within the public school
system. (6) Hold the schools established under this act
accountable for meeting measurable academic standards and
provide the school with a method to establish accountability
systems.6 5
This section explicitly envisions that the public school system will continue to
exist and that charters are an add-on, not a replacement, of that system.
This legislative intent is incorporated as one of the four factors that
66
authorizers must consider in evaluating new applications. Another of those four
factors is the extent to which the proposed school will be a model for other public
schools.67 Both of these required factors presume the existence of the public
school system. If the fiscal impact of charter expansion significantly harms the
existing district, or doesn't "expand opportunities" but, rather, replaces them,
then the proposed charter school violates the legislative intent of the CSL.
In addition, the law uses "including but not limited to" language in listing
the factors authorizers should consider. The CSL directs authorizers to evaluate
applications
based on criteria, including, but not limited to, the following:
(i) The demonstrated, sustainable support for the charter school
plan by teachers, parents, other community members and
students, including comments received at the public hearing
held under subsection (d). (ii) The capability of the charter
school applicant, in terms of support and planning, to provide
comprehensive learning experiences to students pursuant to the
adopted charter. (iii) The extent to which the application
considers the information requested in section 1719-A and
conforms to the legislative intent outlined in section 1702-A.
(iv) The extent to which the charter school may serve as a model
for other public schools.68
The "including but not limited to" language means that the list of specific
factors is not exclusive.6 9 An applicant can satisfy all of the explicit factors yet

§ 17-1702-A (West 2018) (emphasis added).

65

24 PA. STAT.

66

Id. § 17-1717-A(e)(2)(iii).

67

Id. § 17-1717-A(e)(2)(iv).
Id. § 17-1717-A(e)(2) (emphasis added).

68

AND CONS. STAT. ANN.

Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 102 A.3d 962, 976 (2014) (explaining
69
that "Turning to the next phrase, it is widely accepted that general expressions such as 'including,'
or 'including but not limited to,' that precede a specific list of included items are to be considered
as words of enlargement and not limitation. .. . Indeed, such a list of specific items is not meant to
be exclusive of all items other than those specifically named.").
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still be denied if it violates other provisions of Pennsylvania law. What if a
charter applicant wishes to locate in a site inaccessible to families without cars?o
What if an applicant is facing non-renewal of existing charters based on financial
improprieties?" Charter applicants in Philadelphia have comprised a wide range
of entities and some have presented flaws not specified in section 1717-A. 72
The CSL requires an authorizer to evaluate "the extent to which the
[proposed] charter school may serve as a model for other public schools."" A
proposed charter school cannot be a model if its existence will harm those
schools and undercut their capacity to educate their students. A charter is not a
model and fails to fulfill the intent of the CSL if it does not equitably serve
students facing learning obstacles such as a lack of English proficiency,
disabilities, or homelessness; or uses enrollment practices that district schools
cannot use; or pushes students out through high suspension rates or other
counseling out tactics.
The Charter Appeal Board, as will be discussed below, has on occasion
misread section 1717-A as if the listed factors are the only ones to be considered
and has sometimes asserted that, under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, 74 that the
explicit factors all relate to education so that "non-education" factors like cost
are not relevant. 75 Neither of these conclusions holds up to careful analysis. The
listed factors go well beyond curriculum and teacher qualification; they explicitly
incorporate the legislative intent language of section 1702-A, which itself
envisions the continuation of the existing school system. The listed factors also
include the information required under section 1719-A-3, which includes many
elements not directly educational in nature such as the governance structure of
the proposed school, the involvement of community groups in developing the
application, a description of the physical facility including its owner and any
Benjamin Herold, Questionable Application Processes at Green Woods,
Other Charter
Schools,
THE
PHILA.
PUB.
SCH.
NOTEBOOK
(Sept.
14,
2012),
https://thenotebook.org/articles/2012/09/1 4 /questionable-application-processes-at-green-woodsother-charter-schools/ (detailing problematic admissions barriers, including Green Woods nowabandoned approach of requiring parents to attend a lottery held outside of Philadelphia).
71
Greg Windle, FirstHearings Heldfor Nine ProposedNew Charters,THE PHILA.
PUB. SCH.
NOTEBOOK (Dec. 19, 2017, 6:44 PM), https://thenotebook.org/articles/2017/12/19/first-hearingsheld-for-nine-proposed-new-charters/ (noting that ASPIRA applied for two new charters even
though it was facing non-renewal of two existing charters based on financial problems, caused in
part by the settlement of sexual harassment suits filed against its CEO).
72
See Susan L. DeJarnatt, Oversight, CharterSchools, and a Thorough and
Efficient System
ofPublic Education, S.C. L. REv. (forthcoming 2019).
73
§ 17-1717-A(e)(2)(iv).
74
"[T]he axiom that '[g]eneral words shall be construed to take their meanings
and be
restricted by preceding particular words.' [sic] However, this principle of ejusdem generis
generally pertains where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or
things." In re Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 191 A.3d 750, 782 n.1 1 (Pa. 2018)
(quoting 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1903(b) (West 2018)).
7
See infra Part V.B.
70
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lease arrangements, and plans for liability insurance, among other pieces of
information. And section 1717-A explicitly directs authorizers to consider
76
factors including, but not limited to, the listed ones.
The CSL thus presumes the existence of traditional school districts that
as authorizers and that will be able to learn from and replicate
serve
will
innovations provided by charters. The CSL does not envision granting charters
in a way that would inflict serious harm on districts or that would swallow the
districts whole and eliminate them.
The CSL also includes a provision that would have the state reimburse
77
districts in part for the costs of the new charters. The law thus recognized the
financial impact charters would impose on districts, even if the legislators did
not grasp the full scope of that impact. But this funding has not been authorized
since 2011 in the state budget, causing a loss for Philadelphia of $110 million
8
then and an increasing loss for each succeeding year with that funding.'
The plain language of the statute should be sufficient to refute the "no
consideration of financial impact" argument. But, because the argument has had
such tenacity in Pennsylvania, it is useful to look further to legislative history
and court opinions.
B.

The Legislative History of the CSL Shows That the Legislature
Intended Chartersto Supplement and Not Replace TraditionalPublic
Schools

Pennsylvania legislative history tends to be sparse and the Charter
School Law is no exception. There are no hearings or committee reports
available, just different versions of the legislation and floor comments in the
House and Senate Journals.
The key theme of the floor comments on the Charter School Law is that
charters will be a supplement to the existing school system which will be
improved by the innovative examples charters will provide. The proponents of
what became the Charter School Law repeatedly referred to charters as part of
the public school system.7 9 They expected the costs to be manageable, not that

76

n

§ 17-1717-A(e)(2).
§ 17-1725-A(b), (c).

Dan Hardy et al., Corbett Chops Public School Funding, PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 8, 2011),
https://www.philly.com/philly/news/breaking/20110308_Corbett-chops_public schoolfunding.
html; RFA Data, supra note 5, at 2-3.
H.R. 181-41, Sess. of 1997, at 1456 (Pa. 1997) ("1 think that it [the bill] is a reasonable
79
approach to efforts that we ought to engage in, that we ought to promote to help school districts
create more quality academic program options for their citizens, for their students in the context of
the public school system."); S. 181-38, Sess. of 1997, at 754 (Pa. 1997) ("There has been a great
interest, though, in charter schools and in the fact that charter schools can, as a part of the public
school system, play a very small but significant role in creating a new kind of niche for parents,
for teachers, for learning opportunities for students that can provide a different kind of opportunity
78
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they could present an existential threat to existing school districts.80 Most of the
proponents just focused on what they saw as the benefits of adding choice to the
school system.
None of the debates show that the legislators had any real grasp of how
expensive this project was going to be before intentionally deciding to require
charter growth despite the expense. The one proponent to address the costs
implications in any detail, Senator Schwartz, talked about the financial drain that
might come from "a few charter schools."8 2 Senator Piccola, one of the sponsors
of the legislation, urged the school districts to look at charters as partners, not
adversaries and warned them not to be obstructionist." But he never asserted that
they are not allowed to consider the cost implications.
for those particular students, and if they work well, to be a source of innovation and creativity
within our public school system, and I look forward to that. I think that is worthwhile."); Id. at 756
("The concept of charter schools is clear. Charter schools will provide the Commonwealth's
parents with a new educational option for their children, an option that is within Pennsylvania's
system of public schools, an option that still maintains high standards of accountability."); Id. at
757 ("Moreover, an effective charter school bill is one which allows charter schools to supplement
and not to undermine our public schools. I believe that these themes run clearly throughout the
provisions of this charter school bill."); Id. at 758 ("These key points underscore the General
Assembly's objective in approving the charter school legislation. Charter schools are not a panacea
for all of the real or perceived shortcomings of our system of public education, and I do not want
this to be viewed in any way, shape, or form as an attack upon the system. It is a spoke in the wheel,
just as early childhood education is, just as funding is, just as parental involvement is."); Id. at 758
("We have heard of the process and the merits and the advantages offered by this bill to parents of
schoolchildren throughout the Commonwealth as they try to improve public education, and they
will be able to do it without undermining the public education system in Pennsylvania.").
80
H.R. 181-41, Sess. of 1997, at 1457 (Pa. 1997) ("[T]his more reasonable
compromise
provides for some State funding, some State funding to school districts that incur extraordinary
costs because of the creation of charter schools and particularly school districts that incur
extraordinary obligations to charter schools for new students who are attracted to the public school
system, the charter school piece of it, from nonpublic schools."). Sen. Schwartz, in favor of the
legislation, noted that the administration had compromised on the cost concern by agreeing to 7.5
million in new funding to help districts manage the financial burden. S. 181-38, Sess. Of 1997, at
755 (Pa. 1997).
81
See, e.g., H.R. 181-41, Sess. of 1997, at 1468 (Pa. 1997) ("I intend to vote for SB 123 on
concurrence, and I am not voting for it because I think it is needed to replace a failing public school
system ... .We need to raise the bar of achievement in the public school system commensurate
with the bar that has been raised in the workplace. That is what this is about. That is what school
reform is about. It is not about bashing public schools. Our public school system is great, but it
needs to be better because the workplace bar has been raised, and I believe, I believe charter schools
can do that in various ways."). Rep. Battisto made no mention of costs. See also id. at 1469, 1470
(comments of Rep. Kirkland and Rep. Perzel). Rep Sturla expressed concern that the appeals board
would overrule local control and proposed an amendment to leave the appeals decision to local
school boards as long as there were at least 50 charter schools in the state. Id. at 1465. That
amendment was defeated without any real discussion.
82
S. 181-38, Sess. Of 1997, at 755 (Pa. 1997). Senator Schwartz's concerns were
assuaged by
the administration's offer of $7.5 million over two years to meet those burdens.
3
Id. at 758.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 6

830

WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 121

The Charter School Law was signed by Governor Ridge on June 19,
1997. The language of Sections 1702-A and 1717-A has not been amended since
enactment.
The CSL has undergone other changes, though none that explicitly
address the financial impact issue. The amendment that could have most directly
touched on the costs of charters to school districts was the amendment of Section
1723 in 2008 to include the following clause:
Enrollment of students in a charter school or cyber charter
school shall not be subject to a cap or otherwise limited by any
past or future action of a board of school directors, a board of
control established under Article XVII-B, a special board of
control established under section 692 or any other governing
authority, unless agreed to by the charter school or cyber charter
84
school as part of a written charter pursuant to section 1720-A.
Enrollment has an obvious relationship to costs, but this amendment says
nothing about use of financial impact as a criterion for charter expansion. While
this amendment seems to be an effort to constrain authorizers from unilaterally
imposing enrollment caps on new charters, the only information from the Senate
Journal on this language is instructive:
The PRESIDENT: "The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Philadelphia, Senator Hughes."
Senator HUGHES: "Madam President, would the Majority
Leader stand for a very brief moment of interrogation, please?"
Senator PILEGGI: "I will, Madam President."
The PRESIDENT: "He indicates he will."
Senator HUGHES: "Madam President, I have two very brief
questions. Does the language in Section 1723-A, regarding the
number of students enrolled in a charter school, prohibit a
schoolboard or any other governing authority from capping
student enrollment when the charter school agreement comes up
for renewal if the current charter school agreement already
contains an enrollment cap?"
Senator PILEGGI: "Madam President, no, it does not. That is
not the intent of the language in this bill."

84

24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.

§

17-1723-A(d)(1) (West 2018).
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Senator HUGHES: "Secondly, Madam President, if the current
agreement already contains an enrollment cap, can a school
board or any other governing authority be prohibited from
capping student enrollment when the charter school agreement
is up for renewal?"
Senator PILEGGI: "Again, Madam President, that is not the
intent of the legislation.'
Senator HUGHES: "Thank you, Madam President. No more
questions."85
This exchange is illuminating in two ways. First, the amendment did not
preclude caps entirely; it just required that they be negotiated by the authorizers
and the charter applicants.8 6 Second, the exchange supports the argument that
existing caps would continue to be effective." There is no discussion at all of the
financial impact either on charters that are unable to expand or on districts that
may be financially burdened by uncontrolled charter growth. Enrollment to be
sure has a significant cost impact, but enrollment also affects other aspects of a
school: what grades it offers, what services will be needed. While this provision
now requires negotiations with existing charters about controlling growth, it does
not preclude considering fiscal impact on decisions related to the denial of a
charter application or to a renewal or revocation decision.
In short, nothing in the legislative history of the CSL directly or
indirectly supports the position that authorizers must totally ignore financial
impact. The legislators wanted to create an innovative supplement to the existing
system. They planned to fund these supplements out of existing school budgets
but did not envision that the supplements would harm or reduce educational
opportunities within the existing system of public education. They may have
underestimated the costs of charters but they never said or implied that
authorizers should be forbidden from considering financial impact as a factor in
decisions regarding charters.
V. THE ORIGINS

OF THE MYTH: NEWS ACCOUNTS AND

CAB DECISIONS

So where did this notion come from, if not from the legislative
proponents or the law itself? The earliest mentions I can find are from newspaper
articles and from decisions by the Charter Appeals Board. This section will

85

S. 192-54, Sess. of 2008, at 2429 (Pa. 2008).

86

§ 17-1723-A(d)(1).

8
See Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Dep't of Educ., 92 A.3d 746 (Pa. 2014) (holding
that enrollment
caps agreed to before enactment of this provision remained valid and enforceable).
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address both of those sources and show that they are, at best, a very shaky
foundation for this myth that the CSL forbids consideration of financial impact.
A.

ContemporaneousNews Articles Do Not Mention the "No
Considerationof Costs" Myth

The "no consideration of costs" myth that districts cannot consider costs
has obscure origins. The news accounts from the time the CSL was passed do
not mention this "rule."" In an op-ed published in the New Pittsburgh Courier,
Representative Ron Cowell, then chair of the House Education Conmittee,
praised passage of the CSL. He stressed: "The charter school law is not about
privatization or escaping public education .... Instead the law is intended to
enhance public education by allowing the creation of more quality academic
options within the public school system." After his praise though he goes on to
state:
Finally, there remain problems with funding. Inadequate state
funding will likely cause some school boards to reject proposals
to establish charter schools which may impact on school district
taxes or the resources available to other schools in the district.
This is a serious problem with roots in the inadequacy of our
entire school finance system. It is a system-wide problem we
must address and, in doing so, we can remove funding concerns
as an obstacle to the approval of charter schools by local school
boards.8 9
Representative Cowell not only thought the law allowed consideration of
financial impact, he expected that school district authorizers would deny charters
on that exact basis.
Other accounts note concerns about costs but not any statement from
supporters or opponents that districts will be unable to consider costs in their
authorization decisions. A Philadelphia Inquirer article detailing the final debates
over the bill mentions the concern opponents had about costs but says nothing
90
about a bar on considering costs. Another Inquirer article about the first
authorizations under the new law quotes the Philadelphia School District's
managing director, Clarence Armbrister, as saying: "All things being equal, it

may not be in our best financial interests to approve charter schools . . . [b]ut it

is the district's intent to provide a world-class education . .. that overrides any

Rep. Ron Cowell, Reasonable Compromise for Charter Schools, NEW PIrrSBURGH
COURIER, Aug. 16, 1997.
89
Id.
Russell E. Eshleman, Jr. & Dale Mezzacappa, Pa. Senate PassesCharterSchool Bill, PHILA.
90
88

INQUIRER, June 12, 1997, at Al, A16.
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financial considerations." 9 1 The article does not say the District was forbidden
from considering financial impact; rather the Armbrister quote shows that the
District did consider costs and decided to authorize these four schools despite the
costs. The article also notes: "Although the state has allocated millions for the
creation of charter schools, district officials said it would not cover the full costs
of launching the charters. The additional costs will add to a budget deficit already
projected at more than $140 million in 1998-99."92
The earliest mention I was able to find with the "can't consider costs"
language was from the Pittsburgh-Post Gazette in 1998 stating that: "Cost is not
mentioned in the charter school law's criteria for judging applications. Pittsburgh
officials have interpreted this to mean that the law does not allow cost to be a
factor in deciding whether to approve a charter school." 93 Two years later, that
interpretation had become more of a blanket statement, an incorrect one, about
what the CSL actually said: "However, the state law authorizing charter schools
says school districts can't use financial considerations as reasons to turn down
potential charter schools." 94 This article did not cite or quote any provision of the
CSL in support of this assertion. And there is no such provision.
Another historical note is worth mentioning here. In 2015, the Governor
of Pennsylvania did not believe in the "can't consider costs" myth. In 2015,
Philadelphia was forced by the state legislature to consider applications for new
charters. 9 5 It had not accepted new applications for several years leading up to
2015 though it had converted over 20 existing schools into charters through its
Renaissance program during that time.96 The SRC had to vote on 39

91
Richard Jones, 4 Phila. Charters Approved, PHILA. INQUIRER, (Aug. 22,
1997), at A21,
https://www.newspapers.com/image/i 77868244.
92
Id
93
Carmen J. Lee, Charting a Course: School Districts Learning the Lessons
of Charter
Schools, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 22, 1998, at B-4.
94
Judy Laurinatis, CharterSchools Seen as Budget Drain: Public Hearing in Penn
Hills for
Firstof Three ProposalsRaises Money Worries, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 13, 2000, at E10.
95
In exchange for approval of Philadelphia's decision to raise money
for public schools
through a tax on cigarettes, the Pennsylvania legislature required the Philadelphia School District
to accept new charter applications, and it eliminated Philadelphia's exemption from appeals to the
CAB. Dan McQuade, Bill That Approved Cigarette Tax Guarantees More Charter Schools in
Philadelphia,
PHILA.
MAG.
(Sept.
29,
2014,
10:14
AM),
https://www.phillymag.com/news/201 4 /0 9 / 2 9 /bill-approved-cigarette-tax-guarantees-charterschools-philadelphia/.
96
Kevin McCorry, SRC Overrules Superintendent Hite, Moves to
Convert Three Schools Into
Charters, WH{YY (Jan. 21, 2016), https://whyy.org/articles/src-overrules-superintendent-hitemoves-to-convert-three-schools-into-charters-photos/.
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applications."7 Governor Wolf was opposed to charter expansion in Philadelphia
on grounds of cost.
Gov. Wolf, sources said, has told the SRC he wants it to approve
no new charters because the School District cannot afford them.
Asked about the governor's position on charter schools, Wolf s
press secretary, Jeffrey Sheridan, wrote in an e-mail: "The Wolf
administration believes the SRC must stabilize, not worsen, the
district's finances. It cannot spend money it does not have for
new charters or other expenses. It is past time we reaffirm our
98
commitment to high quality public education for all children."
The Wolf administration did not subscribe to the myth that financial impact is
irrelevant to charter authorization. It is also noteworthy that the overall costs of
charter growth were so high that even a proponent of privatization, like Governor
Corbett, took steps to protect the Commonwealth, though not the local districts,
99
from the financial impact.
In 2014, the Post-Gazette reiterated the assertion that: "[u]nder state law,
school districts cannot reject a charter school application based on cost."" The
CSL contains no language prohibiting consideration of costs. It didn't then and
it doesn't now. The prohibition myth does not even appear until 1998 and is not
based on the CSL's language or on the debates that accompanied its passage. The
origin-the misinterpretation of unnamed Pittsburgh officials-is no basis for
the claim that authorizing districts are forbidden from any consideration of how
charter growth will financially impact their ability to provide a thorough and
efficient system of public education through all of their existing schools, charter
and traditional. The purchase of the "no consideration of costs" myth by the
Charter Appeals Board is similarly flawed.

Holly Otterbein, SRC Approves 5 of 39 New Charter School Applications, PHILA. MAG.
97
(Feb. 18, 2015, 8:51 PM), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2015/02/18/src-approves-5-new-

charter-schools-philadelphia-update/.
Kristen A. Graham, Pressure is Building to OK Phila. Charters,PHFLA. INQUIRER (Feb. 17,
9
2015), at B4. This article also quotes then-SRC Chair Bill Green as saying that "only state
regulations" could be considered in the authorization decision. Id. In contrast, former SRC
Commissioner Joe Dworetzky disagreed, writing to the SRC that: "the district cannot afford new
charters." Id. New charter schools, he said, are "extraordinarily expensive." Id. The SRC is obliged
to consider the impact of new charter-school seats on current district students, Dworetzky said. Id.
"That $7,000-per-student-per-year loss is not a 'paper loss,"' Dworetzky wrote. Id. "The district
must actually fund it and the only place where most of those funds can come from is by way of
further reductions to the instructional services that benefit the remaining students. That isn't fair
and it isn't equitable." Id.
9

Id.
Eleanor Chute, Pittsburgh School Board Rejects CharterSchool Expansion at Frick Park,
https://www.postPM),
9:11
2014,
23,
(July
POST-GAZETTE
PITTSBURGH
2
gazette.com/news/education/ 014/07/23/Pittsburgh-school-board-rejects-charter-school2
expansion-at-Frick-Park/stories/ 01407230220.
100
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CAB Decisions: Buying into the Myth with Little to No Authority

The Charter Appeals Board seems to have bought into the myth but an
examination of its decisions reveals little or no analysis and no citations showing
support in the law itself. The CSL established an appeals process for applicants
whose charters were disapproved by the authorizer or revoked or not renewed.'o'
The CAB is composed of seven individuals appointed by the Governor and
confirmed by the Senate.' 02 As of this writing, the CAB has issued opinions in
146 cases, dating back to 1999."' In a handful of those opinions, the CAB has
stated that authorizers cannot consider financial impact though its reasoning is
unsound and not consistent with the language of the CSL. The following sections
analyze these opinions and show how they are either not on point or misinterpret
the CSL.
1.

Not Really On Point: Lack of Standing of Taxpayers in Adjacent
Districts to Oppose Charter Applications

In three cases, the CAB denied petitions to intervene filed by taxpayers
residing in school districts adjoining the district where the proposed charter
would be located, finding that the taxpayers' claimed harm was too speculative.
Although these opinions reject consideration of the financial impact on these
particular taxpayers, the key reason for denying intervention was that any
financial impact would be too speculative to justify the taxpayers' participation
in the proceeding. None of these opinions stated that financial impact was a
101

24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1717-A(f) (West 2018).
One of the legislative
compromises that allowed enactment of the CSL was that the CAB would not hear appeals for two
years following enactment. Cowell, supra note 88. As a result, many of the early CAB decisions
focus on procedural issues, including whether it had jurisdiction over applications that were denied
during those first two years. Keystone Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep't of Educ., 799 A.2d 209 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2002). After the state takeover of Philadelphia under the Distressed Schools Act, the
CAB had no jurisdiction over charter decisions in Philadelphia until the 2013 compromise. § 6-

696(i)(2)(i).

102
The seven members of the CAB must include (1) a parent of
a school-aged child, (2) a
school board member, (3) a certified teacher actively employed in a public school, (4) a faculty
member or administrative employee of an institution of higher education, (5) a member of the
business community, (6) a member of the State Board of Education, and (7) the State Secretary of
Education. There is no requirement that any member be a lawyer. § 17-1721-A(a). The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania noted that "the composition of the CAB supports a finding of de
novo review [at the CAB level]. The CAB is not comprised of attorneys capable of conducting a
legal examination of the evidence, but rather consists of persons who have a perspective on public
education." W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Collegium Charter Sch., 812 A.2d 1172, 1180 (Pa. 2002).
103
Appeal Board Decisions, PA DEP'T OF EDUC., https://www.education.pa.gov/K12/Charter/o2OSchools/Pages/CABDecisions.aspx?&&pSortBehavior-O&pFileLeafRef-201201%20Graystone%20Academy/20Charter%20School%2epdf&&PageFirstRow--1&View-9064

a324-2e37-455c-bd4f-860a994335cc (last visited Mar. 23, 2019).
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forbidden consideration. For example, in denying intervention in In re: Ronald
H. Brown CharterSchool,104 the CAB noted:
Petitioners' arguments are based on mere speculation. Even
though the School District will be required to pay subsidy
money to the Charter School for the resident students attending
the Charter School, there is no proof that taxes will be raised
more quickly by the School District or that programs will be
reduced or eliminated as a result. Additionally, the Legislature
knew that school subsidy money would flow from the school
districts to the charter schools. Nevertheless, the Legislature did
not authorize persons such as Petitioners the right to intervene
in the CAB appeal process.os
In Ronald Brown, the School District itself did not raise financial impact as a
basis for denial of the charter.106 It focused its opposition on whether the charter
applicant had sufficiently demonstrated community support and the CAB ruled
that it had.
In a similar denial of an adjoining district's taxpayer's petition to
intervene, the CAB held:
It is only speculation about the numbers, if any, of the
Downingtown students who may actually attend Phoenix
Academy, and even if students residing in Downingtown attend
Phoenix Academy, there is no evidence that taxes will be raised
or that there will be a reduction in services in Petitioners' district
as a result.107
This logic was used to deny a petition to intervene in the Collegium Charter
108
School case as well.

In re Ronald H. Brown Charter Sch., CAB No. 1999-1, 15 (Dec. 1999),
2
http://www.education.pa.gov/K-12/Charter/`2OSchools/Charter/2OBoard%2OAppeal% 0
Opinions/1 999-01%2ORonald%20H.%2OBrown%20Charter%20School.pdf.
104

105
106

Id.
Id.

107
In re Appeal of Phoenix Academy Charter Sch., CAB No. 1999-10, 3 (Aug. 27, 1999),
2
http://www.education.pa.gov/K-12/Charter/`20Schools/Charter/2OBoard%2OAppeal% 0
Opinions/1999 -10%20Phoenix%20Academy%20Chartero/o2OSchool.pdf.
108
See generally In re Collegium Charter Sch., CAB No. 1999-9 (Aug. 27, 1999),
2
http://www.education.pa.gov/K-12/Charter/`20Schools/Charter%/'20Board%20Appeal% 0
Opinions/1 999-09%20Collegium%20Charter%20School.pdf.
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Flawed Reasoning to Support the "No Consideration of Costs"
Myth

The CAB decisions that buy most directly into the "no consideration of
costs" myth rely on flawed reasoning. Essentially the CAB asserts that, by
deciding to fund charters through school district budgets, the legislature has
already performed a cost/benefit analysis and no further consideration of impact
or costs is allowed. For example:
In its Notice of Determination, which delineated the reasons
that the KCSD denied the Application, one of the stated reasons
for denying the Application was that it would "be wasteful of
School District taxpayer monies." This motivation, to deny a
charter because the district would lose money, is contrary to the
Charter School Law. By encouraging the creation of charter
schools and by explicitly funding charter schools from school
district revenues, the legislature intended for districts to give up
a portion of their revenues in order to allow charter schools to
operate. Conversely, the legislature did not include financial
considerations among the criteria upon which a charter school
application should be judged. Therefore, it was directly contrary
to the intent of the Charter School Law for KCSD to rely upon
the loss of revenue or the "waste of taxpayers[sic] monies" as a
factor in the analysis of whether to grant a charter. We disagree
with KCSD's findings in this regard, and reject them. 109
In the Collegium appeal, the CAB stated that:
The Directors state in finding of fact number fifteen that,
because the Legislature imposed funding of charter schools
upon the local school district, the local district could inquire into
the costs and benefits of the charter school in order to be certain
tax dollars were prudently spent. This is a conclusion, not a

finding of fact.

In findings of fact numbers sixteen through twenty-two, the
Directors continue to set forth conclusions regarding its
cost/benefit analysis of a charter school. The Directors speculate
that the reduction in costs to the District will be minor in
comparison to the increase in costs because it is unlikely the
District will be able to reduce staff or facilities but will have less
subsidy money for expenditures. We conclude that the District's
109
In re Sugar Valley Rural Charter Sch., CAB No. 1999-4,
16-17 (Nov. 1999),
https://www.education.pa.gov/K-12/Charter/20Schools/Charter/`2OBoard%2OAppeal%20
Opinions/ 1999-04%20Sugar%20Valley%20Rural%20Charter%2School.pdf,
aff'd on other
grounds, Keystone Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Sugar Valley Concerned Citizens, 799 A.2d 209 (Pa.
Cornmw. Ct. 2002).
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cost/benefit inquiry is not a proper inquiry for the District, nor
is it a proper basis upon which to deny a charter, because a
cost/benefit analysis has already been performed by the
Legislature. When the Legislature passed the Charter Law it
knew that the funding mechanism set forth therein required
school districts to pay subsidy money to charter schools attended
by a school district's resident students. Obviously, by passing
the Charter Law with this funding mechanism for charter
schools, the Legislature decided that the cost to school districts
was outweighed by the benefit of having charter schools.
10
Therefore, the District's cost/benefit analysis is not relevant."
The CAB included dicta in its decision upholding the denial of a charter
in the In re: Appeal of Phoenix Academy CharterSchool." case which tracked
the language above:
(6) Detrimental Effects On The Education Of Remaining
Phoenixvile Students.
Phoenixville's sixth reason is not explicitly set forth in the
Charter Law. Phoenixville determined that the "including but
not limited to" language of § 17-1717-A (e)(2) authorized
Phoenix Academy to be denied a charter because the granting of
the charter would have detrimental effects on the education of
the remaining students in Phoenixville. In particular,
Phoenixville claimed that the district was "uniquely encumbered
with four simultaneous and significant strains on its operations.
These strains were: (1) the district's teaching staff working
without a contract; (2) major building renovations on the high
school and middle school to start in July 1999; (3) the recent
approval of a $10,000,000 bond issue; and (4) the relative
inexperience of three fourths of the district's central
administrators and building administrators in their current
positions. According to the District, these reasons collectively,
when combined with the teacher disapproval of the application,
"create an unacceptable risk to the orderly administration of the
District and to the delivery of quality education to those many
students who will remain in District schools." March 16 letter
denying the application, p. 5.
The disruption and detrimental impact alleged by
Phoenixville, is based upon factors that commonly exist in
110
In re Collegium Charter Sch., CAB No. 1999-9, 17 (Aug. 27. 1999),
2
http://www.education.pa.gov/K-12/Charter/`2OSchools/Charter/2OBoard%2OAppeal% 0
Opinions/1999-09%2OCollegium%2Charter%/o2OSchool.pdf.
1999),
In re Appeal of Phoenix Academy Charter Sch., CAB No. 1999-10 (Aug. 27,
M
2
0
http://www.education.pa.gov/K-12/Charter/`20Schools/Charter/`2OBoard%2OAppeal%
Opinions/1 999-10%2OPhoenix%2OAcademy%/o2OCharter/2OSchool.pdf
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school districts and would exist regardless of the granting of a
charter. The strains mentioned by Phoenixville seem to be fairly
routine operational issues that school districts regularly
encounter, and similar to the existence of charter schools, are
just a factor of school districts existing and doing business.
Additionally, when the General Assembly passed the Charter
Law, it knew and understood the potential impact of charter
schools on school districts because of the funding mechanism
set forth in the Charter Law. However, the General Assembly
obviously determined that the benefits of charter schools
outweighed the costs. Therefore, these financial reasons set forth
by Phoenixville as support for denial of the charter are not
appropriate, and Phoenixville's decision is reversed on this
factor.112
The CAB engaged in no analysis of the language of the CSL, the
legislative history of the CSL, or of the actual costs imposed by charter expansion
in any of these cases. As demonstrated above, the legislature had no real
appreciation of the actual costs and its members repeatedly expressed their intent
not to undermine the public school system. Those members who were concerned
about local costs thought the state would be playing a role in offsetting them.
There is no evidence that in creating the funding system, the legislators intended
to bar authorizers from exercising any kind of responsible financial stewardship
as charter authorizers. As is clear in both the plain language of the CSL and its
legislative history, they meant to supplement, not destroy the public education
system. By choosing to make the districts responsible for authorization, the
legislators had to have intended for the districts to perform that role responsibly.
The CAB failed to grapple with these realities.

In re Phoenix Academy, CAB No. 1999-10 at 26-27; see also In re Hills
Academy Charter
Sch.,
CAB
No.
1999-12,
19
(Aug.
27,
1999),
http://www.education.pa.gov/K2
1 /CharterO/o20Schools/Chartero/o2OBoard%2OAppeal%200pinions/1999-12%2OHills%20
Academy%20charter/o2OSchool.pdf. The CAB affirmed denial of the charter application based on
lack of community support but proceeded to opine that:
If Hills meets the Charter Law's requirements, it is entitled to a charter,
regardless of the financial impact on Penn Hills. The financial impact of a
charter school on a school district is irrelevant because when the General
Assembly passed the Charter Law, it knew and understood the potential impact
of charter schools on school districts due to the funding mechanism set forth
in the Charter Law. However, when it enacted the Charter Law, the General
Assembly obviously determined that the benefits of charter schools outweigh
the costs, and neither Penn Hills nor the CAB has the power to "overrule" that
decision. Therefore, the financial impact set forth by Penn Hills as support for
denial of the charter is not appropriate.
Id.
112
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3.

CAB Decisions That Distort the CSL by Looking Only at the
Listed Factors Instead of the Included but Not Limited to Language

The CAB in some decisions also distorts the language of the CSL by
looking onry to the listed factors or by requiring authorizers to prove that the
application fails at least one of them. This interpretation merely pays lip service
to or ignores the "included but not limited to language" entirely, thus misreading
the CSL. In the In re: Arts and 3 R's Inc. d/b/a Helen Murray CharterSchoolfor
the Arts"' appeal, the CAB states that the authorizer "must demonstrate that the
applicant is
application and other information submitted by the charter school
4
is not what
That
deficient under at least one of the criteria enumerated above."ll
the CSL says. As discussed above, consideration of the legislative intent, and
thus the impact on the system does indeed fall under one of the four listed criteria.
But, in addition, the CSL requires the authorizing district to consider those
factors along with others that fit under the "following but not limited to"
language. The authorizer should not be accepting applications that would have a
clear discriminatory impact against students who are English Language Learners
or students with IEPS; it should not grant charters to organizations that plan to
exclude children from poor families by using access to transportation as a

In re Arts and 3 R's Inc. d/b/a Helen Murray Charter Sch. for the Arts, CAB No. 2005-5, 7
https://www.education.pa.gov/K2005),
30,
(Sept.
2005
0
12/Chartero/o20Schools/Chartero/o2OBoard%2OAppeal%20 pinions/
2
-

"

05%20Arts%20and%203%20R's%201nc%20dba%20Helen%20Murray/o20Charter%
df.

OSchool.p

-

Id. The CAB cites Bear Creek in support but Bear Creek does not say this; rather, it rejects
114
an authorizer's comparison of its own budget with the proposed charter budget in finding that the
school's financial plan was unsound. The CAB finds that the CSL does not allow consideration of
an applicant's underestimation of expenses. In re Bear Creek Cmty. Charter Sch., CAB No. 2004http://www.education.pa.gov/K2004),
4,
(Sept.
15
2,
2 0 04
0
12/Charter/o20Schools/Charter/o2OBoard%2OAppeal%20 pinions/
02%20Bearo20Creek%20Community/o20Charter/o20School.pdf Bear Creek also denies the
authorizer the right to consider the poor track record of the EMO proposed by the applicant because
the CSL does not allow the authorizer to "substitute its judgment for that of the Charter School
concerning its relationship with [the EMO]." Id. at 10. This overbroad statement is not consistent
with good oversight which the CSL imposes on authorizers. Again, what if an applicant proposed
to use a CEO or EMO that had a strong track record of fraud? In 2014, Johnny Patterson applied
to open a charter in the Harrisburg School District that he planned to name after June Brown who,
at the time, was under federal indictment for 54 counts of wire fraud. See M. Diane McCormick,
Backers Withdraw Planfor ProposedD. June Brown CharterSchool in Harrisburg,PA PENNLIVE
https://www.pennlive.com/east2014),
15,
(Jan.
Patterson
shore/index.ssf/2014/01/harrisburg charter schoolproposal withdrawn.html.
withdrew the application after issues of plagiarism and fraud arose but the authorizer should
certainly have had the right to consider those issues if the application had not been withdrawn. Id
To top it off, this entire discussion in Helen Murray is dicta because the CAB denied the application
based on a lack of demonstrated support.
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proxy.' What if an application was filed by a former operator who has pled
guilty to tax fraud arising from his operation of a charter school? 1 l 6 The CSL did
not set out every factor for consideration. Meeting the four listed factors does not
guarantee a grant of a charter that is otherwise not in compliance with law and
the authorizers are not required to prove non-compliance with one of the listed
factors where there are other problems with the application.
The CAB also misreads the ejusdem generis analysis. In In re:
Souderton Charter School Collaborative,"7 the school district rejected the
application in part based on the inadequacies in the charter applicant's financial
plan which, in the authorizer's opinion failed to account for funding shortfalls or
for a higher than expected enrollment of students with special needs."' The CAB
found this reasoning speculative and stated that:
Generally, the Charter Law does not provide for denial of a
charter school application for financial reasons. Although a
district is not limited to the criteria listed in Section 17-1717-A,
the criteria are generally educational in nature. Thus, this Board
considers it improper to use financial criteria alone as a basis for
evaluating a charter school application."'
But the CAB here is referring to concerns about the financial position of
the charter school, not about impact on the district. And its reasoning is flawed.
Section 17-1717-A itself directs the authorizer to consider "the extent to which
the application considers the information requested in Section 1719-A" which
itself explicitly includes the proposed school's financial plan.' 2 0 What if an
115

Charter School Renewal Recommendations and CharterAmendment
Requests,

CHARTER

SCH.
OFF., SCH.
DIST.
PHILA.
(May
1, 2017),
https://www.philasd.org/src/wpcontent/uploads/sites/80/201 7 /07/Charter-Powerpoint-Presentation-5.1.17.pdf
116
This example is hypothetical but it would not be unheard
of. In 2017, Commonwealth
Education Connections, Inc., applied for a cyber-charter with the Department of Education. Its
application, filed by Johnny Patterson, was full of omissions and inaccuracies about the schools
CEC purported to operate. Patterson withdrew his application, but the DOE should have denied it
based on the serious credibility concerns it presented. A copy of the application and this author's
testimony to the DOE is on file with the author. See Sugar Valley, CAB No. 1999-4 at 16-17.
117
In re Souderton Charter Sch. Collaborative,
CAB No. 1999-2 (Dec. 1999),
http://www.education.pa.gov/K1 2 /Charter/20Schools/Charter%2OBoard%2OAppeal%200pinions/19990 2 % 2 OSouderton%2OCharter%2OSchool%2OCollaborative.pdf.
118

Id.

1'
120

Id. at 13.
The section lists 17 different elements and many others are
also not "educational in nature."
For example, the governance structure of the proposed school, 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-1719-A(4) (West 2018); the disciplinary procedures, Id. § 1719-A(7); the involvement of
community groups, Id. § 1719-A(8); procedures for handling parent complaints, Id. § 1719-A(10);
the physical facility, Id. § 1719-A(l 1); criminal and background checks for staff, Id. § 1719-A(15,
16); and insurance, Id. § 1719-A(17).
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applicant proposed a school structure that was completely untenable financially.
For example, the application proposes payment to a CEO of a salary in excess of
$1 million? The authorizer ought to be allowed to consider that type of financial
inadequacy on the applicant's part, especially given the relatively high rate of
12 1
fraud within the charter sector in Pennsylvania.
4.

Fell Charter and Chester CharterSchoolfor the Arts: Directly
Buying the "No Consideration of Costs" Myth Despite the
Language and History of the CSL

Two more CAB decisions merit a close look: In re: Fell Charter
23
and In re: Chester CharterSchoolfor the Arts.1 In Fell, the CAB lists
School
124
It proceeds
the 1717-A criteria though it notes these are not the only criteria.
any court
or
history,
legislative
its
CSL,
the
to
citation
any
to state, without
provide
not
does
Law
School
Charter
"The
Law:
of
interpretation, a Conclusion
be
should
application
an
which
upon
basis
that financial impact should be a
educational
be
to
evaluation
for
evaluated. The legislature intended the criteria
in nature, and therefore, evaluating an application on the basis of financial
1 25
considerations is improper."
In its analysis, the CAB quotes In re: Souderton Charter School
of
Collaborativel26 for the proposition that "this Board considers the creation
12 7
But
improper."
be
to
application
school
charter
a
judging
for
financial criteria
the objection raised in Souderton was to the financial structure of the proposed
1 22

See DePasquale Report, supra note 42. Susan L. DeJarnatt, Follow the Money: Charter
121
Schools and Financial Accountability, 44 URB. LAw. 37, 49-52 (2012). The saga of Nick
Trombetta and the PA Cyber School is illustrative of the problems flowing from lack of oversight.
Trombetta, the founder of the school, pled guilty to tax conspiracy resulting from his
"misdirection" of$8 million from the school; Paula Reed Ward, Cyber CharterFounderTrombetta
is Sentenced to 20 Months in Prison, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (July 24, 2018, 7:49 PM),
2
https://www.post-gazette.com/news/crime-courts/ 018/07/24/Cyber-Charter-founder-Trombettasentenced-20-months-prison-8-million-midland-beaver-county/stories/201807240110.
122
In re Fell Charter Sch., CAB No. 2001-9, 6, 9-10 (May

2,

2 00

http://www.education.pa.gov/Kl2/Charter/2OSchools/Charter/`2OBoard%2OAppeal%

2002),
pinio

ns/2001-09%20Fell%20Charter/o20School.pdf.
(July 25, 2012),
2
0
http://www.education.pa.gov/K-12/Charter/o2OSchools/Charter/`2OBoard%2OAppeal%
2
2
2
O
0v%/o
0Arts%
Opinions/2012-02%20Chester/o20Charter%/o20School%20for%/o20the%
123

In

re Chester Charter

Sch. for the

Arts, CAB

No.

2012-02

ChesterUplandSD.pdf.
124
In re Fell, CAB No. 2001-9 at 6, 9-10.
125
Id. at 7.
126

In

re Souderton

Charter

Sch.

Collaborative,

CAB

No.

1999-2

(Dec.

http://www.education.pa.gov/K-12/Charter%20Schools/Charter/`20Board%20Appeal%
Opinions/i 999-02%20Souderton%20Charter/o20School%20Collaborative.pdf
127
In re Fell, CAB No. 2001-9 at 28.
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charter school, not to financial impact on the district.1 28 Fell goes on to quote
Sugar Valley for the proposition that: "the school district's reliance 'upon the
loss of revenue or the "waste of taxpayers monies" as a factor in the analysis of
whether to grant a charter' was 'directly contrary to the intent of the Charter
School Law."' (Docket No. CAB 1999- 4), p. 16 ." 129 The CAB thus conflates the
underlying premise of the CSL's funding mechanism-that charters would
receive tuition from the school district its students reside in-with the much
broader notion that there could be no consideration at all of how granting the
charter could undercut the authorizing district's ability to provide education to
the students remaining in the district or those in existing charter schools.
In addition, the line of demarcation that the CAB draws between
"educational criteria" and "financial impact" ignores how intimately funding and
education are connected. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument
made in the school funding litigation that the only constitutional obligation the
Commonwealth has is to provide buildings with the lights on. 3 0 The Court took
the constitutional obligation seriously and recognized that the plaintiffs stated a
cognizable claim in arguing that Pennsylvania's poor support for education and
the huge disparities between districts violate the Constitution because a thorough
and efficient system of public education requires adequate finances in order to
provide education. The two are interdependent, not independent.
The CAB's analysis in the Chester Charter Schoolfor the Arts is even
more suspect."' In this decision from 2012, the CAB blandly states that it is
"well-settled" that authorizers cannot consider financial
impact, citing Keystone,
which cites Collegium. But there are two enormous problems with the CAB's
reliance on Keystone. The Commonwealth Court did not cite Collegium for the
point about financial impact; rather, it cited Collegium on the scope of review of
CAB decisions. 3 2 The only mention in Keystone of the financial impact
argument is in a footnote to the court's description of the CAB's findings of fact
that states in full:

128
The Souderton decision was also wrong on this point as noted above. See
In re Souderton
Charter Sch. Collaborative, CAB No. 1999-2 (Dec. 1999), http://www.education.pa.gov/K1 2 /Charter/20Schools/Charter/2OBoard%2OAppeal%200pinions/1 99902 2
% OSouderton%2OCharterO/2OSchool%2OCollaborative.pdf
129
The Commonwealth Court's opinion upholding the CAB decision is utterly
silent on this
point even though the court reviews the CAB decision on every other criteria individually, and the
school proponents presented the argument in their brief. Brief for Appellee at 11, Carbondale Area
Sch. Dist. v. Fell Charter Sch., 829 A.2d 400 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2003) (quoting Keystone Cent. Sch.
Dist. v. Sugar Valley Concerned Citizens, 799 A.2d 209 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)).
130
See generally William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep't of Educ., 170 A.3d
414 (Pa. 2017).
131
In re Chester Charter, CAB No. 2012-02.
132
Keystone Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Sugar Valley Concerned Citizens, 799 A.2d
209, 216 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2002).
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One of the reasons the School Board denied Sugar Valley's
application is based on the perceived notion that it would have a
negative effect on the taxpayers in the school district. The CAB
concluded that it was improper for the School Board to deny
Sugar Valley's application, in part, on this basis. We agree. The
General Assembly specifically provided that the funding for
charter schools shall come from school district revenues. To
deny the charter school because it may deplete school district
33
revenues is inconsistent with the purpose of the CSL.'
Additionally, Collegium itself upheld the denial of a taxpayer petition to
intervene on the grounds that any harm would be too remote to provide a basis
for intervention.
Taxpayers' interests, based only on a possibility that taxes and
services would be adversely affected, are too remote to provide
a basis for intervention. Further, any change in taxes or services
in neighboring school districts would be the direct result, not of
the charter grant itself, but of those school districts' response to
that grant. Accordingly, because Taxpayers have not shown an
interest that would be directly affected or bound by the CAB's
action in this matter, we conclude that the CAB did not abuse its
discretion in denying Taxpayers' petition to intervene under 1
Pa. Code § 35.28(a)(2). 13 4
The CAB then rejects any consideration of the dire financial straits of
the authorizing district, Chester-Upland, which had been subject to state takeover
and was drowning from the financial devastation wrought by having half its
students enrolled in charters.1 3 5 The notion that the legislative choice in 1997 to
fund charters through moving tuition money out of districts was the end of any
further consideration ignores reality and the stated legislative intent to have
charters add to-not supplant or destroy-existing public systems. Indeed, the
Pennsylvania appellate courts have not adopted this view.

133

Id. at 218 n. 14.

W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Collegium Charter Sch., 760 A.2d 452, 467 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000), aff'd, 812 A.2d 1172 (Pa. 2002).
The costs of the special education funding led to litigation in 2015 over the District's
135
inability to pay the $40,000 per student tuition that the formula required for special education
students. The parties agreed to reduce that figure to $27,028.72 per student, still a significant hit to
the District. Vince Sullivan, Judge OKs Chester UplandSchool DistrictDeal with CharterSchool,
DAILY TIMES (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.delcotimes.com/news/judge-oks-chester-uplandschool-district-deal-with-charter-school/article_4fl47030-a888-5676-b07e-6f72bce7ef87.html.
134
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VI. COURT INTERPRETATION: No PRECEDENTIAL APPELLATE DECISION SAYS
THAT AUTHORIZERS ARE FORBIDDEN FROM CONSIDERING THE FINANCIAL
IMPACT OF CHARTER GROWTH

Not a single court decision from the Pennsylvania appellate courts has
held that authorizers are forbidden from any consideration of financial impact
when they are making charter decisions.
The closest a court has come to supporting this argument is the footnote
in Keystone that refers only to the legislative choice of the funding mechanism
and is a note to the court's listing of the CAB's finding that the school's financial
management plan was sound. 13 6 Keystone decided three issues: First, it
determined that an initial tie vote did not preclude the CAB from revoting later
on the appeal.' Second, the court held that the charter applicant's appeal to the
CAB was not premature, even though it was filed during the two-year
moratorium on appeals to the CAB. It ruled that the moratorium just delayed the
set-up of the CAB but did not bar the CAB from hearing appeals that were filed
during the moratorium." Finally, the court determined that the CAB had de novo
review over districts' decisions on authorizing charters.' 39 The footnote that
mentioned the funding mechanism is to the court's description of the CAB's fact
findings and not to any of the legal analysis.' 40 That is hardly a substantial basis
for any claim that it is "well-settled" that financial impact cannot be a factor.141
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has issued five opinions interpreting
the Charter School Law.' 42 It has consistently adhered to the admonitions of the
36
"In addition, the CAB found that Sugar Valley's comprehensive
five-year financial
management plan was sound and that it was actively pursuing a new facility, and that the

application should not have been denied on that basis because Sugar Valley was willing to delay
the opening of the school until a proper facility was located." Keystone, 799 A.2d at 218.
137
Id. at 214-15.
38
Id. at 215-17.
13
Id. at 217-20.
140
Id. at 218 n.14 The text sentence reads: "In addition, the CAB found
that Sugar Valley's
comprehensive five-year financial management plan was sound." Note 14 itself states:
One of the reasons the School Board denied Sugar Valley's application is based
on the perceived notion that it would have a negative effect on the taxpayers
in the school district. The CAB concluded that it was improper for the School
Board to deny Sugar Valley's application, in part, on this basis. We agree. The
General Assembly specifically provided that the funding for charter schools
shall come from school district revenues. To deny the charter school because
it may deplete school district revenues is inconsistent with the purpose of the
CSL.
Id.
141
None of the Commonwealth Court decisions on appeals from the CAB
squarely uphold the
"no consideration of costs" argument, even when it was adopted in the underlying
CAB decision.
142
Discovery Charter Sch. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 166 A.3d 304 (Pa. 2017); Sch.
Dist. of Phila.
v. Dep't of Educ., 92 A.3d 746 (Pa. 2014); Slippery Rock Area Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Cyber Charter
Sch., 31 A.3d 657, 667 (Pa. 2011); W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Collegium Charter Sch., 812
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Statutory Construction Act and to the plain language of the CSL in these
decisions. It abides by the plain language and has refused to insert procedures or
language that is not contained within the CSL, even where the proposed language
143
might be wise or an improvement. The Supreme Court has not adopted the "no
consideration of costs" argument, even when invited to do by the parties'
briefs. 1
There are only three mentions of financial impact in the Court's
Collegium decision, none of which supports the argument that it is a forbidden
consideration. First, in its description of the history of the case, the Court notes
that the School District had said that the choice offered by the charter would
come "at the expense of either an increased tax burden on the School District
45
taxpayers or a reduction in services to the existing public school systems." The
A.2d 1172 (Pa. 2002); Mosaica Acad. Charter Sch. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 813 A.2d
813, 818-20 (Pa. 2002). These include Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep't of Educ., 151
A.3d 129 (Pa. 2016) (liability of school district for closed charter's failure to make PSERS
payments); W. Phila. Achievement Charter Sch. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 132 A.3d 957 (Pa. 2016)
(Empowerment Act unconstitutional under non-delegation provisions to extent it purports to
exempt SRC from CSL); Friends of Pa. Leadership Charter Sch. v. Chester Cty. Bd. of Assessment
Appeals, 101 A.3d 66 (Pa. 2014) (retroactive exemption from taxes under CSL violates separation
of powers under state constitution); 500 James Hance Ct. v. Pa. Prevailing Wage Appeals Bd., 33
A.3d 555 (Pa. 2011) (applicability of prevailing wage regulations to work done under charter
school lease); Zager v. Chester Cmty. Charter Sch., 934 A.2d 1227 (Pa. 2007) (charter schools are
agencies subject to Pennsylvania's Right to Know Act).
See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Phila., 92 A.3d at 746 (holding that the enrollment cap amendment
143
to the CSL did not invalidate a cap that was in a written charter agreed to by the charter school
before the amendment was adopted); Slippery Rock, 31 A.3d at 667 (holding that district was not
obligated to pay tuition to charter for kindergarten students who were too young to enroll in the
district's kindergarten and noting that its decision was "guided by the recognition that the district's
funding obligation is inextricably linked to its duty to provide a public education"); W Chester
Area Sch. Dist., 812 A.2d at 1187 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
held that the CAB had de novo review over authorizers' decisions, that a charter could choose
whether to be a regional charter even if it planned to recruit students from multiple districts, and
that schools could contract with for-profit managers as long as the school was incorporated as a
non-profit); Mosaica, 813 A.2d at 818-20 (holding that the School District of Philadelphia had no
right to attack the decision of the Bensalem Township School Board to grant a charter to Mosaica,
even though the school enrolled 60% of its students from Philadelphia).
See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 42, Discovery Charter Sch. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 166 A.3d
14
304 (Pa. 2017) (No. 16 EAP 2016), 2016 WL 8649011. Counsel went on to state:
The financial impact on the District is not a proper basis for denying an
enrollment increase. As the Commonwealth Court has recognized in the
context of an initial charter application, the "General Assembly specifically
provided that the funding for charter schools shall come from school district
revenues. To deny the charter school because it may deplete school district
revenues is inconsistent with the purpose of the [Charter School Law]."
The brief goes on to argue, rather inconsistently, that "[i]t costs the District less money for children
to attend Discovery than it does to educate students in its own schools." Id. at 44.
W Chester Area Sch. Dist., 812 A.2d at 1175. The Commonwealth Court, similarly,
145
described the history of the District's decision as including evaluation of the explicit criteria and
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Court engaged in no further analysis of this point or even further mention of it.
It did not reject this concern as invalid under the CSL. Second, in its discussion
of the regional charter issue, the Court expresses sympathy for the "legitimate
concerns" that giving the applicant control over the regional charter decision
"may result in the non-chartering school district incurring financial obligations
to the charter school when it has no control over the decisions being made on
behalf of the charter school."l 46 The Court does not say that concern is irrelevant
because such costs cannot be considered in evaluating a charter. Rather, it says
that the concerns "should be directed to the General Assembly" which has
allowed the applicant to make the choice whether or not to apply for a regional
charter.1 47

Finally, the Court upholds the denial of the taxpayers' petition to
intervene. It cites the Commonwealth Court's decision describing the taxpayers'
interest as too speculative to warrant intervention. 148 Like the Commonwealth
Court, the Supreme Court does not say the taxpayers' concerns are irrelevant; it
says they lack proof that they will face a negative financial impact. 14 9 If anything,
the Court's silence supports the argument that, with proof, financial impact could
be a valid consideration for an authorizing district.
The Court's most recent examination of the CSL was in 2017 when it
held that the plain language of the CSL, which details the procedures for appeals
to the CAB, limits the jurisdiction of the CAB to appeals from denials of charters
and decisions to revoke or not renew an existing charter.1 50 It does not give the
CAB jurisdiction to consider rejection of a request for an amendment of a charter,
because CSL sets forth no procedure for amendment or a standard for evaluating
an amendment request. The background facts of the case involved a charter
school, Discovery, that wanted to nearly double its enrollment and move to a
different facility.' 5 ' Its charter contained an enrollment cap and a provision that
required the written consent of the School District for any relocation.1 52 When
the charter was up for renewal, the District recommended renewal without the
expansion or change of address and the school refused to sign the renewal

"based on the fiscal impact of the charter school on the School District, performing a cost/benefit
analysis. After evaluating these criteria, the District Board made 53 separate findings of fact ...
and, based on those findings, concluded that the legislative intent of the CSL had not been fulfilled
by Collegium's application." W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 760 A.2d at 455 n.6. That was the end of
the discussion of fiscal impact in both of the decisions.
146
Id. at 1183.
"47

Id.

148

Id. at 1186-87.

1so
151

See generally Discovery Charter Sch. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 166
A.3d 304 (Pa. 2017).
Id. at 307.

152

Id
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charter.15 3 The school continued to operate without a signed charter but
petitioned for appeal to the CAB, arguing that the District's refusal 154to act on its
request for an amendment was an appealable denial of the request. The CAB
found it had no jurisdiction over the amendment but the Commonwealth Court
155
The Supreme
reversed, holding that the CAB had jurisdiction by implication.
56
statutory
comprehensive
and
detailed
the
reviewed
It
Court reversed again.
for
criteria
the
including
CAB,
the
to
provisions controlling the appeal process
or
renewal
for
ones
consideration of a charter application and separate
157
revocation, and the procedural requirements for an appeal.
The Court's analysis in Discovery refutes the argument that section
somehow excludes financial impact from playing any role in an authorizer's
decision. The CSL nowhere mentions amendments of existing charters. It
provides for renewal or revocation but not amendment. The Court held "that8 the
CSL as drafted by our Legislature does not provide for amendments."' In
contrast, the intent provision of the CSL explicitly directs that new charters
59
operate as additions to the existing system of public education.1 The section on
evaluation of applications explicitly includes the requirement that the authorizer
consider the intent of the CSL-which, as explained above-envisions charter
schools as a supplement, not a replacement of the existing system of public
education. 160 Just as the Court refused to judicially amend the CSL to expand the
CAB's jurisdiction to include amendments, the CSL must be read as written-to
not limit the authorizer's consideration of all factors which will further the intent
of the CSL and which will affect the authorizer's ability to effectively
incorporate and supervise the charters within its existing system.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Pennsylvania's Constitution mandates that the Commonwealth provide
"for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public
61
The Pennsylvania
education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth."
Supreme Court recently traced the history of the clause and of Pennsylvania's
commitment to public education as essential to democracy. It stressed:
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While the procedural posture of this case militates against
delving deeply into the history of-or drawing broad
conclusions regarding the collective intent underlying-the
phrase "thorough and efficient," some contemporaneous context
nonetheless is illuminating. Most notably, delegates to the
convention appear to have linked the importance of public
education to the success of democracy, with William Darlington
averring that "the perpetuity of free institutions rests, in a large
degree, upon the intelligence of the people, and that intelligence
is to be secured by education," and further opining that "[t]he
section on education is second in importance to no other section
to be submitted to this Convention." 162
Pennsylvania's experiment with charter schools must be considered in
light of this commitment to public education and to its role in preparing the
Commonwealth's students for their participation in democracy.
The underlying problem with Pennsylvania's system of funding charters
is that it forces the charters and the districts, both educating large numbers of
marginalized and disadvantaged students, to fight each other for crumbs. 163 It
also forces competition, not cooperation, on the charters and districts, thwarting
the original purpose of the CSL to promote innovation and to have charters serve
as a model for public schools. Representative Cowell recognized this problem
back in 1997 when he called on Pennsylvania to fix the funding system so that
the competition for scarce resources. would not undercut the charter school
experiment. 164
For now, though, until the foundational funding problem is resolved, the
fight for crumbs cannot be allowed to further undercut Pennsylvania and its
school districts' capacity for meeting the constitutional obligation to provide a
thorough and efficient system of public education. School districts must be
empowered to consider the needs of all of their students, their families, and the
surrounding community members when they make decisions about charter
growth. The CAB should correct its misinterpretations and the courts should
squarely uphold the ability of authorizers to act in the best interests of all of the
stakeholders in their communities. Pennsylvania cannot have a thorough and
efficient system of public education without empowering districts to fully

162
William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep't of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 423-24 (Pa. 2017)
(citing Pa.
Ass'n of Rural & Small Sch. v. Ridge, 11 M.D. 1991, slip op. at 98 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 9, 1998),

aff'dper curiam, 737 A.2d 246 (Pa. 1999) (quoting 11 Pennsylvania Debates of 1873, at 421)).
163
Osamudia James has critiqued the use of market-based choice in education,
examining "the
ways in which race and racism warp the market, undermining the possibility that an education
market could ever genuinely optimize educational outcomes for marginalized students and families
in that market." Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination,

99 IOWA L. REv. 1083, 1104 (2014).
164
Cowell, supra note 89.
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consider the effect of the decisions they make.
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